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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 Utility Workers United Association, Local 537 (the “Association”) brought this 
action alleging Pennsylvania American Water Company (“PAWC”) breached the terms 
of two contracts. PAWC contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear this case and, 
alternatively, the Association failed to state a claim because the contracts at issue are null 
and void. While we disagree with PAWC on the question of jurisdiction, we agree that 
the Association has failed to state a claim. Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court’s 
grant of PAWC’s motion to dismiss.  
I. 
The Association, a labor organization, is the exclusive bargaining representative 
for certain employees of PAWC. These employees were previously represented by 
System Local 537 of the Utility Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO (“Former 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
3 
Union”). PAWC and the Former Union entered into collective-bargaining agreements—
the contracts at issue in this case. 
On March 19, 2018, the employees covered by the contracts determined to 
disaffiliate from the Former Union and affiliate with the Association as their exclusive 
bargaining representative. 
Later, employees filed petitions with the National Labor Relations Board seeking 
to decertify the Former Union and to have the Association certified as their exclusive 
bargaining representative. In December 2018, the NLRB held elections on the petitions, 
resulting in the Association’s certification as the exclusive bargaining representative for 
the employees. Once the Association was certified, PAWC refused to honor the contracts 
it entered into with the Former Union. PAWC contends the certification rendered the 
contracts between it and the Former Union null and void, creating an obligation for the 
Association to bargain with PAWC for a new contract. 
The Association commenced this litigation, and PAWC filed a motion to dismiss 
the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The trial 
court granted the motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This 









The question of whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction is an issue of 
law we review de novo. In re Phar–Mor, Inc. Sec. Litig., 172 F.3d 270, 273 (3d Cir. 
1999). Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, provides 
United States district courts with jurisdiction over suits for violations of contracts 
between an employer and a labor organization. PAWC contends there is no jurisdiction 
under § 301 because there is no labor contract between the parties. We disagree. 
Section 301 “confers jurisdiction on a district court to determine the existence of a 
collective bargaining agreement.” Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Int’l Union, UAW, 856 F.2d 579, 
590 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Pittsburgh Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Int’l Union of 
Operating Eng’rs, Local Union No. 66, 580 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he 
existence of a contract is not a jurisdictional element of a section 301 claim.”). 





2 The trial court, by virtue of adopting Magistrate Judge Lenihan’s report, found it lacked 
jurisdiction because, in order to determine the contract issue, it would have to determine 
an issue of representation—whether the Association was a successor to the Former 
Union—which it believed was within the NLRB’s exclusive jurisdiction. We find, 
however, that the well-pleaded facts show the representation question was already settled 




The issue of the plausibility of the Association’s claims also came before us on 
appeal, and we now consider PAWC’s 12(b)(6) motion.3 In analyzing a 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss, we accept as true the well-pleaded facts of the amended complaint and 
disregard legal conclusions. Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 341, 351 (3d Cir. 
2016).4 
In order to state a claim for breach of contract against PAWC under § 301, the 
Association must allege facts demonstrating the existence of a contract in effect between 
the parties at the time of the alleged breach. See 29 U.S.C. § 185; Pittsburgh Mack, 580 
F.3d at 190.5 The Association premises this action on the contracts executed between 
PAWC and the Former Union. But the well-pleaded facts show that those contracts 
became null and void prior to the alleged breaches.  
A contract between a former union and an employer becomes null and void when 
a challenging union prevails against the former union in an NLRB representation election 
 
3 Though the trial court granted the motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, we may 
affirm on any basis supported by the record. Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 350 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (citing Guthrie v. Lady Jane Collieries, Inc., 722 F.2d 1141, 1144–45 (3d Cir. 
1983)). 
 
4 Additionally, we “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and 
determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be 
entitled to relief.” Pittsburgh Mack, 580 F.3d at 192 (quoting McTernan v. City of York, 
Pa., 564 F.3d 636, 646 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
 
5 The Association contends in its complaint that it is party to contracts with PAWC by 
nature of being a successor to the Former Union. We disregard the Association’s legal 
conclusions regarding its successor status. 
 
6 
and the challenging union is certified as the new collective-bargaining representative of 
the employer’s employees. RCA Del Caribe, Inc., 262 NLRB 963, 966 (1982); see More 
Truck Lines, 336 NLRB 772, 773 (2001) (“[I]f a challenging union is certified, then the 
contract between the employer and the incumbent becomes void . . . .”) enfd., 324 F.3d 
735 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
Here, the Association prevailed over the Former Union in the NLRB 
representation elections and was certified as the new collective-bargaining representative 
of the relevant employees. Upon the Association’s certification, the contracts executed 
between PAWC and the Former Union became null and void.6 Once the contracts became 
null and void, PAWC refused to honor them moving forward. Because PAWC cannot 
breach a contract that is null and void, we will affirm the court’s order on the ground that 
the Association failed to state a claim.  
III. 
 For the reasons provided, we will affirm the dismissal. 
 
6 The National Labor Relations Board reached the same conclusion in NLRB Case No. 
06-CB-235968. The NLRB case began when, pursuant to a charge PAWC filed with the 
NLRB, the General Counsel issued a complaint alleging, among other things, that the 
Association violated § 8(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act by failing to bargain 
with PAWC for an initial contract. See NLRB Case No. 06-CB-235968; J.A. 199A. The 
Association argued that it should not have to bargain for an initial contract because it is a 
successor to the Former Union with the option of accepting the Former Union’s contracts 
with PAWC. Supp. J.A. 232A. PAWC filed a motion for partial summary judgment on 
the effect of the Association’s NLRB election and certification as bargaining 
representative. Supp. J.A. 232A. On June 8, 2020, the NLRB issued a decision holding 
that the collective-bargaining agreements between PAWC and the Former Union were 
voided by the Association’s post-election certification. Supp. J.A. 232A-234A. Though 
we reach the same conclusion, we do not rely on the NLRB decision. 
 
